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Global warming is today, without a doubt, one of the biggest international issues. Whilst 
no country will go completely unscathed by future consequences of climate change, the 
impacts thereof – in terms of loss of life as well as the relative effects on economies – are 
expected to be felt most severely in developing countries, specifically Africa. Nevertheless, 
the development of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the global 
environmental treaty – the Kyoto Protocol – has brought with it the potential of socially 
and environmentally sustainable industrial and energy development in Africa.  
This paper examines the carbon trading system resulting from the Kyoto protocol, and 
investigates the implications of the associated Clean Development Mechanism for Africa. 
Although the carbon market is still in its formative stages, the benefits of this research are 
plentiful. Not only is such research critical for raising awareness, but also ensures that 
African countries get a foothold in this nascent market.  
It is found that while producing carbon credits, CDM projects also have the potential to 
bring numerous benefits – such as sustainable development, transfer of skills and 
technology, improved adaptive capabilities, as well as access to new markets – to African 
host countries. If changes are implemented as suggested, the CDM has the potential to 
bring billions of dollars to Africa – a feat invaluable to the social and environmental 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Global warming is today, without a doubt, one of the biggest global issues. For over a 
decade now, it has become increasingly evident that the growing concentration of 
greenhouse gases in the upper atmosphere is leading to climate change – manifesting 
predominantly as increases in mean global temperatures, but also being accompanied by 
precipitation changes, variation in oceanic circulation and changes in extreme weather 
events, among other things.  
Whilst no country will go completely unscathed by the future consequences of climate 
change, “the effects of climate change are expected to be greatest in developing countries in 
terms of loss of life and relative effects on investment and economy” (IPCC, 2001b). Of the 
developing regions of the world, Africa
1 is viewed as the most vulnerable to impacts of 
climate change. Small scale agricultural activities not only supply the bulk of food produced 
in Africa, but also provide 70% of all employment on the continent (Simms and Reid, 
2005:2). Due to the dependence of farming activities on direct rainfall, African 
constituencies are exceptionally susceptible to weather uncertainties and extremes 
associated with climate change. The disproportionate exposure of African populations to 
climate related shocks such as floods, droughts, cyclones, heat waves and the spread of 
diseases greatly exacerbates this problem. Moreover, due to the extreme poverty that riddles 
much of the continent, African countries’ adaptive capabilities are severely limited (Greene, 
2005a:20). As such, those countries which have contributed least to climate change will be 
the first to face its consequences. 
Since ownership of the air is absent, the upper atmosphere is essentially a global public 
good. Consequently, the emission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere poses the 
problem of a widespread, or global, externality, in which the use of the atmosphere by one 
nation imposes costs on other nations. In the same breath, the benefits of emission 
abatement programmes accrue to all nations, while the costs of such programmes are borne 
by the country instituting these programmes alone. Owing to the nature of this problem, 
there is only a weak incentive for countries to institute emission control schemes 
independently – severely complicating policy solutions and at the same time necessitating 
global action to counter the problem of climate change.  
                                                 
1 Africa will in this study refer to sub-Saharan Africa. North African countries are excluded from the study as 
“they do not share many of the problems and characteristics that are considered typical of the remaining group 
of African countries” (Burger, 2003:1).    
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In the light of the global climate crisis, international negotiations have led to the adoption of 
the first legally binding environmental treaty in the world in 1997 – the Kyoto protocol. 
Under the protocol, governments are held accountable for meeting specified emission 
reduction targets, while at the same time being encouraged to make use of the market based 
flexible mechanisms specified by the Protocol to realize their targets. These flexible 
mechanisms enable the trading of emission permits between countries, in essence providing 
the framework for an international carbon market. 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one of these flexible mechanisms. Under the 
CDM, projects in developing countries which decrease greenhouse gas emissions and 
simultaneously foster sustainable development can earn tradeable certified emission 
reduction credits (CERs). Developed countries can in turn purchase these CERs to meet a 
portion of their reduction commitments under the protocol. As such, the mechanism brings 
with it opportunities for both developed and developing countries. While developed 
countries are provided with a cost effective means of cutting emissions, developing 
countries benefit from sustainability promoting projects. Among other things, these projects 
promote the transfer of skills and technology, improve the host country’s adaptive 
capabilities, provide access to new markets, as well as contributing to the general 
improvement of the economic, social and environmental milieu in the developing host 
countries. Consequently, the value of actions taken toward environmental protection is 
essentially doubled.  
It is commonly recognized that Africa’s main concern is sustainable economic development. 
As such, Africa’s role in the climate change crisis is adaptation, not mitigation. 
Nevertheless, the synergy between emission abatement and sustainable development 
provided by the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM, seems to be extremely suitable for Africa – 
providing the potential of socially and environmentally sustainable industrial and energy 
development in Africa. Unfortunately, however, Africa has hitherto only sparsely benefited 
from the financial and entrepreneurial gains associated with the CDM. Existing investments 
are overwhelmingly concentrated in the Asia Pacific and Latin America, with African CDM 
projects currently accounting for less than three percent of the international CDM initiatives 
(Fenhann, 2007). In the light of the above, it is critical that African countries channel 
resources toward investigating, and exploiting, the opportunities presented by this new 
global market.  
3 
This paper aims to examine the carbon trading system resulting from the Kyoto protocol, 
and to investigate the implications of the associated Clean Development Mechanism for 
Africa. This topic is critical for raising awareness and ensuring that African countries get a 
foothold in this nascent market. The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 provides a 
basic introduction to climate change, examines the nature of this problem, and provides a 
theoretical overview of different mechanisms to tackle the global problem of climate 
change. Section 3 discusses the carbon market, its recent developments and the international 
regulatory systems that govern it. Section 4 examines the most important of these regulatory 
systems – the CDM. An overview is given of the workings of the CDM, as well as 
international CDM developments. Section 5 analyzes the CDM in an African context. It 
provides an overview of CDM developments in Africa; examines the potential and 
advantages of an expansion of the mechanism on the continent; investigates factors which 
prevent the exploitation of CDM related opportunities in Africa; and finally provides a 
number of policy recommendations to promote the development of the CDM in Africa. 
Section 6 concludes.  
2.  THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
2.1 What is climate change? 
Both weather and climate are changing constantly – by location, season and time. ‘Climate 
change’ occurs when there is a noteworthy change in the ‘average’ climate state – 
specifically an extended (decades or longer) rise in the average mean temperature of the 
earth’s surface. Climate change occurs due to both natural external changes (such as the 
expulsion of large amounts of aerosols during volcanic eruptions), as well as external 
human influences – such as changes in land use, deforestation and the combustion of fossil 
fuels (Stowell, 2005:3). 
In order to fully understand climate change, it is necessary to elaborate briefly on the 
complex relationship between the sun and the climate system which makes the earth 
liveable. Solar energy, in the form of short-wavelength radiation (ultraviolet light) enters the 
earth’s atmosphere and is absorbed by objects on the ground, warming the earth’s surface. 
The energy which is not absorbed by the earth’s surface, or is released by the warmed 
objects, is reflected in the form of long wavelengths (infrared radiation) – most of which are 
absorbed by greenhouse gases such as water vapour, carbon dioxide, ozone, methane,  
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nitrous oxide, halocarbons and other industrial gases, present in the earth’s  atmosphere. 
These greenhouse gases are transparent to ultraviolet light, but absorb infrared radiation, 
forming a heat preserving layer around the earth and resulting in a delicate ‘greenhouse 
effect’ which makes the earth inhabitable (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2002:108; Stowell, 
2005:3). 
The greenhouse effect constitutes a delicate balance – energy that enters the atmosphere also 
has to exit it. Since pre-industrial times, however, the earth has seen an unprecedented 
increase in emissions of carbon dioxide (through the burning of fossil fuels and the 
destruction of forests), methane (mainly from agricultural activities), ozone (from 
automobile exhausts) and other industrial gases, making it increasingly difficult for energy 
to be returned to space. In an effort to compensate for the additional energy, the earth 
climate adjusts through increases in mean global temperature, changes in precipitation 
patterns and more extreme weather patterns – a phenomenon referred to as the ‘enhanced’ 
greenhouse effect, or global warming (Davies, 1998:447; Stowell, 2005:4-5). 
2.2 Climate change - a global externality problem 
Greenhouse gases are a par excellence example of uniformly mixing pollutants – on 
entering the atmosphere, greenhouse gases mix uniformly, making the location of their 
emissions irrelevant to the location of their impact (Perman et al., 1999:360). Consequently, 
the problem of global greenhouse gas pollution can be examined from two angles. Firstly, 
the atmosphere is essentially an international common property resource, resulting in the 
common property resource dilemma: nations using the resource treat its services as free, 
while in reality, it is actually scarce. As a result, the use of the atmosphere (in this case as a 
waste sink) by one country imposes a negative externality on other countries making use of 
the same resource. Alternatively, all efforts made to reduce emissions can be viewed as the 
provision of a global public good. While the benefits of environmental pollution control 
accrue to all countries making use of the resource, the costs are carried only by the country 
instigating the pollution control – weakening incentives for countries to instigate pollution 
control schemes unilaterally (Wagner, 2002:127). On the contrary, outcomes may even be 
perverse, with countries having an incentive to free-ride on the abatement efforts of others 
(Perman et al., 1999:339; Nordhaus, 2005:2).  
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From whichever angle it is viewed, it is clear that owing to the absence of property rights of 
the atmosphere, global warming is essentially a global externality problem – resulting in the 
emission of inefficient amounts of greenhouse gases (Nordhaus, 2000:502). The critical 
distinction between national and global externality problems is that while governments exist 
to ensure the internalization of national externalities, the same is not true for global 
commons. Nations are sovereign and no supranational government exists which can ensure 
the internalization of global externalities (Hanley et al., 1997:163). It follows that global 
cooperation is necessary to address the problem of climate change. 
2.3 Possible solutions to the global externality problem - lessons from theory  
“... Policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to 
ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.” 
 (UNFCCC, 1992: Article 3.3) 
A large amount of scientific uncertainty still surrounds the precise effect of increased 
greenhouse gas concentrations: how much warming will occur, when warming will occur, 
and how different areas will be affected (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2002:108-109). While 
some academic research has been devoted to the task of finding the ‘optimal’ level of 
emission abatement,
2 uncertainties about both the costs and benefits associated with climate 
change, as well as uncertainty about the costs of reducing emissions, make this task 
practically impossible. However, minimization of the costs of abatement is nevertheless 
possible through the equalization of the marginal abatement costs across emission sources. 
In order to achieve this, especially in the light of the above mentioned uncertainties, 
standard economic theory prescribes the use of market-based instruments such as a tax on 
emissions or a tradable emission permit system (Perman et al., 1999:316; McKibbin and 
Wilcoxen, 2002:116). 
Market-based policies recognize that different sources encounter different emission 
abatement costs, and accordingly sources are provided with flexibility as to how they are 
going to meet specified emission targets – through implementing better technologies, 
implementing efficiency measures, or (in the case of a trading system) purchasing 
reductions with other sources whose internal abatement costs are lower (Stowell, 2005:13). 
                                                 
2 See for example Nordhaus, 1991.  
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In essence, firms are given the liberty to seek the lowest cost method of pollution abatement 
available to them (Hanley et al., 1997:108). 
Under an emission tax system polluters are charged a predetermined price for each unit of 
emissions. Cost effective allocation of control responsibility is ensured under an emission 
tax system, as polluters will continue to abate until their marginal abatement costs are equal 
to the tax rate, and so are equalized across emission sources. Although there are numerous 
advantages to instituting a system of emission taxes, this system also has a number of 
shortcomings. In circumstances where the costs of control are not known, control authorities 
are not able to determine the tax rate which would lead to the desired level of emission 
reduction. Finding the appropriate tax rate through trial-and-error, makes future planning for 
industry role-players difficult, and so would be met with large opposition (Tietenberg, 1996: 
336-337). Moreover, as emission levels depend on many other factors besides the tax level, 
desired reductions in emissions are not guaranteed under a tax system (Field, 1997:231-
265). A further disadvantage is that if emission charges are uniform across emission sources 
– a necessary requirement for cost effectiveness – they are likely to have considerable 
impacts on international terms of trade
3 (Perman et al., 1999:368).  
While environmental taxes set a price for emissions, but not a quantity, tradable emission 
permits set an absolute cap on the level of emissions but allow the price of permits to be 
determined by the market (accordingly this type of system has become known as a ‘cap-
and-trade’ system). In contrast to a taxation system, a system of tradable emission permits 
provides certainty of environmental performance, while at the same time making it possible 
for authorities to achieve a cost effective allocation without any knowledge of control costs 
– the only condition being, that total global emission must be equal to the total permissible 
annual emissions (Tietenberg, 1994:27; Tietenberg, 1996:397). This is attributable to the 
fact that agents will have an incentive to trade pollution allowances as long as marginal 
abatement costs are different between sources. As long as the marginal abatement costs of 
one nation are lower than that of a second nation, it will always be in the interest of the first 
to abate emissions and sell the excess permits to the source with higher marginal abatement 
costs. As such, trading will continue until marginal abatement costs are equalized across 
pollution sources and the permit market is in equilibrium. Thus, this system allows 
                                                 
3 The exact extent of such an impact is still essentially unexplored, but would depend on factors such as the 
magnitude of the tax, as well as whether the tax is levied on producers or on consumers (Perman et al, 
1990:369).  
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governments to attain their policy objectives while at the same time permitting increased 
flexibility on how these objectives are met (Tietenberg, 1996: 338).  
Beside the above, a system of tradeable emission permits is accompanied by a number of 
other prospective advantages. Firstly, the presence of an international market in emission 
permits brings with it the potential of significant cost savings due to the fact that allowances 
will automatically move from countries which are able to cut emissions most cheaply, to 
those which face comparably high abatement costs (Tietenberg, 1996:397). Further, like 
taxes, marketable permits have been found to encourage technological innovation. If a new 
technology allows a firm to reduce its emissions at a marginal cost which is lower than the 
equilibrium permit price, it is in the interest of that firm to develop and adopt the new 
technology (Tietenberg, 1996:337). Due to the large uncertainty surrounding the ultimate 
damages which will be caused by climate change, technological innovation could be viewed 
as critical to effectively deal with the problem. 
The issue of whether an emission taxation system or a permit trading system is the most 
appropriate way to deal with climate change is a very controversial one, and is the focus of 
many an academic paper
4. It is, however, not within the scope of this paper to enter this 
debate. This paper will examine the architecture of the current Kyoto protocol – i.e. 
absolute, binding emission targets with complete freedom to trade in emission permits – and 
will investigate the implications of this system for Africa.  
3.  ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE: THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE 
CARBON MARKET  
3.1 International developments leading to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol 
Although the Swedish scientist, Svante Arrhenius, identified the “greenhouse effect” as 
early as 1896 (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2007), it was only in 1988, when the UN General 
Assembly endorsed the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and recognized the 
“conservation of climate as part of the common heritage of mankind” (United Nations, 
1988:133) that concerns about climate change can be said to have truly reached the 
international agenda (Stowell, 2005:7). Most of the twenty years since have been spent 
debating how and by whom greenhouse gas emissions are should be abated. The first formal  
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global commitment came in 1992 when the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(from here on referred to simply as ‘the Convention’) adopted the Convention in 1994
5. 
Although the Convention did not set quantitative restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions, 
it laid the foundation for future negotiations (Stowell, 2005:12). 
It was in December 1997, in Kyoto, Japan, that the international community for the first 
time made tangible progress in tackling the global environmental problem of climate 
change. In December 1997, parties to the Convention adopted the Kyoto Protocol to the 
Convention (‘the Protocol’) which stipulated individual, legally-binding quantitative 
commitments for developed countries to cut greenhouse gas emissions, with the overall goal 
of cutting emissions to just under 95% of 1990 levels during the period 2008 to 2012
6 
(Stowell, 2005:12) (UNFCCC, 2007a). Developing countries were excluded from emission 
targets under the Kyoto protocol. As developed countries have attained much of their wealth 
through energy-intensive industrialization, it was decided that it would only be ethical to 
give developing countries the ‘right to develop’ without burdening their development with 
emission constraints. Furthermore, although developing countries are home to 
approximately 80% of the world’s population, their historical contribution to global 
greenhouse gas pollution is only around 25% (Jotzo, 2004:2).  
Although the international commitment for reducing emissions was in place, country 
specific circumstances made the prescription of rigid policies and measures to cut emissions 
impossible. Key international players, in particular the United States, argued that the 
marginal costs of emission reductions varied between countries and sectors, making it 
inefficient and ineffective to meet targets through the use of a prescriptive list. As such, 
flexibility became the key for the adoption of the Protocol and the legally binding 
commitments that came with it (Stowell, 2005:15). Due to the complexity of negotiations, it 
was not until 16 February 2005, with the adoption of the Marrakesh Accords at the seventh 




                                                                                                                                                      
4 See for example Weitzman, 1974; McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2002; Johnson, 2007; Schimmoller, 2007. 
5 The full text of the Convention is available from http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. 
6 The full text of the Kyoto Protocol is available from http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.  
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3.2 The Kyoto Protocol – a framework for an international carbon market 
Countries that are party to the UNFCCC, are divided into two main categories: Annex  
countries, or developed countries (which have accepted legally binding obligations to cut 
greenhouse gas emissions) and non-Annex  countries, or developing countries (which have 
no legal obligation to cut greenhouse gas emissions). The wealthier Annex I countries also 
fall under Annex II of the Convention, as countries which not only have to meet emission 
targets, but also have to pay for the costs incurred by developing country parties in meeting 
their obligations under the Convention (UNFCCC, 1992: Article 12.1)
7. Annex I countries 
of the Convention are included under Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol, which specifies each 
country’s “quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment” as a percentage of the 
respective base year chosen. As of June 2007, 174 countries have ratified the protocol, 
making 61.6% of world emissions subject to the Kyoto Protocol (Stowell, 2005:29) 
(UNFCCC, 2007a).  
The Kyoto protocol is essentially made up of three commitment periods, each of which 
gradually imposes tighter caps on greenhouse gas emissions. The first period, from 2005 to 
2008, serves as a trial period in which parties to the protocol are able to put in place the 
relevant mechanisms in order to begin cutting emissions. The second period, from 2008 to 
2012, sets explicit emission caps for participating countries – requiring them to cut 
emissions by at least 5% below 1990 levels (see Table 1 below for Annex B countries as 
well as their emission targets) (United Nations, 1998: Article 3.1). The final period, 
beginning in 2012, is currently under negotiation (Lindow, 2005:60).  While details for the 
third period and beyond are not yet specified, the “Kyoto Protocol framework is [...] defined 
for an infinite period of time.” Accordingly, countries which have ratified the Protocol are 
compelled to negotiate targets for each consecutive committment period (ie. 2013 – 2017, 
2018 – 2022 etc) (Point Carbon, 2007:43). 
                                                 
7 “[D]eveloped Parties included in Annex II shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, 
as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other 
Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to implement the provisions of the 
Convention” (UNFCCC, 1992: Article 4.5). Obligations of parties to the convention include among other 
things:  i.) the establishment of a national system for the estimation and registry of greenhouse gas emissions 
levels, ii.) a general description of the ways in which the party to the Convention aims to mitigate climate 
change (UNFCCC, 1992: Article 12.1).  
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Table 1: Emission Targets of countries included in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol 
Country  Target reduction percentage 
from base year (1990*) 
EU-15:  Austria, Belgium, Denmark,  Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,  Luxemburg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden,  United Kingdom 
Liechtenstein, Monaco, Switzerland 
Economies in Transition*: Bulgaria,  Czech Republic, 







Canada, Hungary, Japan, Poland  -6% 
Croatia -5% 




* Some economies in transition have a base year other than 1990. 
** The US indicated its intention not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. 
Source: UNFCCC (2007a) 
 
The maximum amount of emissions allowed by each country over the commitment period is 
known as the country’s assigned amount – which is equal to the country’s 1990 emission 
levels, minus it’s respective reduction commitment. To meet these targets, Annex I 
countries have to put in place a number of domestic policies and measures.  However, 
emission targets may also be reached through the use of the market based trading 
mechanisms (also known as “flexibility mechanisms”) specified under the protocol – 
international Emission Trading, “Joint Implementation” and the “Clean Development 
Mechanism.” The use of mechanisms must however be supplementary to each country’s 
domestic emission reduction efforts
8  (United Nations, 1998: Article 17).  
Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol establishes the system of Joint Implementation, under which 
an Annex I country can invest in emission reduction projects in other Annex I countries and 
                                                 
8 While the exact quantity of domestic abatement efforts required is not specified, countries are required to 
demonstrate that the use of mechanisms is merely supplementary to domestic abatement efforts in their 
national communications under the protocol (UNFCCC, 2006).  
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credit the resulting ‘emission reduction units’ (ERUs) against its own target. Joint 
implementation projects are most likely to take place in transition economies, where the 
scope of low cost greenhouse gas emission reductions is the highest (UNFCCC, 2007a) 
(Erion, 2005:91). 
Under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (specified by Article 12 of the Protocol), 
Annex I countries can invest in projects reducing emissions in non-Annex I countries 
(developing countries) and use the Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) received in return 
for this investment to help fulfil their domestic abatement responsibilities (United Nations, 
1998: Article 12.8) (Erion, 2005:91). 
Finally, under Emissions Trading (United Nations, 1998: Article 17), Annex I countries may 
trade some of the emissions from their assigned amounts (known as Assigned Amount Units 
or AAUs) amongst themselves. Carbon credits
9 obtained through the CDM, Joint 
implementation or sink activities may also be traded under this mechanism (UNFCCC, 
2007a) (Erion, 2005:91).  
Of the three mechanisms, the CDM has played the most significant role in the international 
carbon market (UNFCCC, 2007b:152). A summary of Kyoto reduction units under different 
trading mechanisms is given in Table 2 below.  
Table 2: Kyoto reduction Units 
Name of Credit  Abbreviation  Legal Status 
Assigned Amount Unit  AAU  Allocated to Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.
Emission Reduction Unit  ERU  Derived from Joint Implementation 
project activities. 
Certified Emission Reduction  CER  Derived from Clean Development 
Mechanism project activities. 
Source: Greene (2005a:5) 
 
Through the inclusion of the above specified innovative market mechanisms, the Kyoto 
protocol has become the basis for an international carbon trading system (UNFCCC, 
2007a).  The international carbon trading system or “carbon market” is so-named, because 
                                                 
9 In this paper, the term ‘carbon credits’ or ‘credits’ will be used to describe all tradable credits resulting from 
projects aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions.   
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carbon dioxide is internationally the most produced greenhouse gas. Further, other 
greenhouse gas emissions are measured and recorded in terms of their “carbon dioxide 
equivalents
10” (Centric Austria International, 2007:18). 
The implementation of various trading mechanisms, multi-year commitment periods, as 
well as the ability to earn carbon credits by reducing any one of six main greenhouse gases 
provides a way to minimize the economic burden accompanying climate change mitigation 
by ensuring that countries are given flexibility in terms of where, when and how they reduce 
emissions (Stowell, 2005:12-16). The free market system further guarantees, that while the 
ultimate responsibility of reducing emissions lies with the governments which are party to 
the protocol, virtually anyone – including individuals, non-governmental organizations and 
large companies – can participate in emissions trading (Lindow, 2005:56). 
3.3 Developments in the carbon market 
Since the official start of the Kyoto protocol in February 2005, the carbon market has 
matured considerably and has grown at a tremendous pace. The value of the carbon market 
has tripled from 2005 to 2006 – growing from an estimated US$ 10.8 billion in 2005 to 
around US$30 billion in 2006 (see Table 3 below) (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2006:3). Volumes 
traded in the carbon market increased by 130% from 2005 to 2006 and are expected to 
increase further by at least 50% in 2007 (Point Carbon, 2007:i). Project based transactions 
likewise flourished, with volumes traded increasing from 382 MtCO2e (million tons of 
carbon dioxide equivalent) to 508 MtCO2e, accompanied by a rise in value from US$ 2.8 
billion to US$ 5.4 billion. This increase in value is partly due to the significant rise in prices 
of the project-based emission reductions, with the average price for CERs being around 
US$10.90 per tCO2e in 2006 – a 52% increase from 2005 levels (Kapoor and Ambrosi, 
2007:31). 
                                                 
10 Greenhouse gases considered under the carbon trading mechanism include Carbon dioxide (CO2), Methane 
(CH4), Nitrous oxide (N2O), Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and Sulphur hexafluoride 
(SF6). Each carbon credit generated is measured in terms of tonnes of CO2 equivalent (tCO2e). Equivalency 
rates are calculated according to global warming potential of the respective greenhouse gases over a 100 year 
time horizon (UNFCCC, 2006).  
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Table 3: An overview of the carbon market - Volumes and Values for 2005 and 2006 


















Source: Capoor and Ambrosi, 2007:3 
 
In essence, carbon credits have essentially become another financial instrument. Beside their 
basic use of satisfying Kyoto emission reduction requirements, credits can be bought, sold, 
traded and even kept for future use. Moreover, a voluntary market for emission reductions 
as well as a secondary market for CERs has developed to meet different demands arising in 
the market
11. Major greenhouse gas trading programmes already exist in the EU, New South 
Wales, Chicago, the UK and Denmark with many other countries planning and opening 
exchanges around the world (Lindow, 2005:56). 
                                                 
11 Although increased focus on, and development of, the voluntary market are also likely to carry numerous 
benefits for Africa, it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine this market in detail. For more information 
on the voluntary market as well the secondary market for CERs, see Greene (2005a) and Kapoor and Ambrosi 
(2007) respectively.  
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4.  THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 
4.1 About the Clean Development Mechanism 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is currently the most developed of the three 
innovative market mechanisms under the Kyoto protocol. It is a mechanism which 
encourages parties to the protocol to invest in emission reducing projects, which 
simultaneously promote sustainable development, in emerging markets – effectively 
integrating these countries into the carbon market. Moreover, a certain percentage – or 
“share of the proceeds” – of each CDM project will go toward meeting administrative costs, 
as well as financing adaptation activities in developing countries which are “particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change” (United Nations, 1998: Article 12.8) 
(UNFCCC, 2007a) (Erion, 2005:91). 
The CDM has three stated objectives (Greene, 2005a:6): 
1.  “To  assist  parties  not  included  in  Annex  1  of  the  Kyoto  Protocol                   
(i.e. developing countries) in achieving sustainable development. 
2. To contribute to the ultimate objective of the convention, to stabilize 
greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. 
3. To assist Parties included in Annex 1 (developed countries) in achieving 
compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments under article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol.”  
 
Stated simply, the main aim of the CDM is to provide a cost effective way for developed 
countries to meet their emission targets, while simultaneously promoting sustainable 
developments in developing countries. Developed countries are able to receive carbon 
credits through CDM projects either by (co-)financing emission mitigation projects via 
equity investment, via forward purchases, or by buying CERs which have already been 
produced on the secondary market (Jung, 2005:3).  
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4.2 Complexities of the CDM 
In order to ensure that the CDM retains its credibility, a number of international rules have 
been developed and set out in the CDM rulebook
12 which forms part of the Marrakesh 
Accords (UNFCCC, 2007a). This rulebook plays a crucial role in ensuring that CDM 
projects result in “real, measureable and long-term” greenhouse gas emission reductions, 
which are additional to the baseline scenario (Article 12.5, Kyoto Protocol). The ‘baseline’ 
is defined in the CDM rules as “the scenario that reasonably represents the anthropogenic 
emissions by sources of greenhouse gases that would occur in the absence of the proposed 
project activity” (United Nations, 2006:16). The baseline criterion is critical, as it 
determines how many CERs a project will earn. The additionality criterion is 
complementary to the baseline criterion in that it specifies that a CDM project’s greenhouse 
gas emission reduction must be ‘additional’ to those which would have occurred in the 
absence of the project activity or policy intervention (Stowell, 2005:64,66). 
Although in theory the process of the CDM might sound relatively simple, it is evident that 
if a project is to satisfy all the stringent requirements which need to be met and is to be 
beneficial for both the host and the investor country, then the practicalities of the CDM will 
be rather complex. The complexity lies both in the methodology of determining standards 
for additionality and measuring subsequent emission reductions, as well as in the process of 
CDM project approval (Lindow, 2005:57).   
There are a number of stages involved during the verification of a CDM project. The first 
step toward verification is voluntary and entails the submission of a Project Identification 
Note (PIN) by the project developer to the country’s Designated National Authority (DNA). 
The purpose of this first step is to inform the DNA of the details of the project, and 
consequently give the project developer a feel for how the project will be received by the 
DNA. The next step entails project development, and therewith the submission of a more 
formal, Project Design Document (PDD) to both the DNA and the Designated Operational 
Entity (DOE) of the respective country or region. The DNA must, at this stage, give final 
approval of the project and make sure it satisfies the country’s or region’s sustainable 
development requirements.  The purpose of the DOE is, through examination of the PDD, to 
ensure that the methodology of the project is valid, that the baseline scenario and the alleged 
emission reductions are accurate, and that the project satisfies the additionality condition. 
                                                 
12 The bulk of the CDM rulebook was decided upon at the COP-7 in Marrakesh in 2001.  
16 
The third stage thus entails project validation and registration. During this time, the public is 
also allowed to comment on the project. If a positive validation by the DOE is made, the 
project is registered by the CDM Executive Board. The fourth stage involves systematic 
monitoring and surveillance of a project’s performance by the DOE to verify that the project 
satisfies various performance-related indicators. If the project meets the objectives laid out 
in the PDD, the CDM project enters the fifth stage where emissions reduced or sequestered 
are subsequently verified and certified by the DOE.  After reviewing reports submitted by 
the DOE and the DNA, the final decision of whether a project is granted certified emission 
reductions (CERs) lies with the Executive Board. All projects are at this stage also open to a 
further, 30 day, public comment period (Erion, 2005:91-92; Stowell, 2005:73-77). A visual 
representation of the different stages involved in the generation of CERs is given in Figure 1 
below
13. 


















Source: Own drawing based on Erion, 2005:91-92; Stowell, 2005:73-77 
                                                 
13 More information about the CDM project cycle, as well as the institutions which govern the CDM, can be 















4.3 Analyzing the CDM pipeline
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The CDM contributed to an impressive 90% of the demand for project based credits in 2006 
(Kapoor and Ambrosi, 2007:3). The increasing confidentiality surrounding prices and 
contract structures in the project based transaction market, which is accompanying the 
growing competitiveness of the market, is making it difficult to correctly approximate the 
size of the CDM market. Nevertheless, the current portfolio of CDM projects is expected to 
yield 2 billion tons of CO2  equivalent reduction in greenhouse gases by 2012 – 
corresponding to around 17% of the base year greenhouse gas emissions by Annex I parties. 
In response to this booming market governments and companies have set aside over US$ 11 
billion for CDM project funding to 2012 (Ellis and Kamel, 2007:6).  
Despite the fact that the Marrakech Accords accentuate the importance of an “equitable 
geographic distribution of CDM project activities at regional and sub regional levels” 
(UNFCCC, 2001:20), the global geographical distribution of CDM projects is still very 
uneven, with most projects and the highest carbon credit production occuring in China, 
India, Brazil and Mexico. These countries account for a full 79% of internationally proposed 
projects and 84% of total expected credits by 2012.  
China remains the largest CDM player, accounting for just over 53% of the expected credits 
till 2012. Moreover, specific sectors tend to dominate the CDM market, with 40% of 
expected credits to 2012 being the product of reducing HFC emissions and industrial 
sources of N2O. The above abatement projects are popular because they “have a short lead 
time, offer large volumes of credits for low capital investment and mitigation costs, and 
additionality assessments are relatively straightforward” (Ellis and Kamel, 2007:7). A more 
detailed overview of the geographical and sectoral distribution of CDM projects is given in 
Figures 2 and 3 below.  
                                                 
14 “The CDM Pipeline includes CDM projects from the validation stage (start of the 30 days public comment 
period), through registration and to issuance of certified Emission Reductions (CERs). [..] No Project Idea 
Notes (PINs) or projects at a stage before validation are included” (Fenhann, Vincentz and Lema, 2006:1).  
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Figure 2: Geographical distribution of projects in the CDM pipeline 













Source:Own Calculations; Data from Fenhann, 2007 
 
 
Figure 3: Volume of CERs until 2012 from projects in CDM pipeline: by region and sector 













Source:Own Calculations; Data from Fenhann, 2007   
                                                 
15 The following subcategories are contained in the above used categories: Landfill etc: Cement, Coal 
bed/mine methane, Fugitive and Landfill gas; Renewables: Biogas, Biomass energy, Geothermal, Hydro, 
Solar, Tidal, Wind. EE categories represent credits resulting from Energy Efficient activities.  
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5.  AFRICA AND THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 
5.1 An overview of current CDM developments in Africa 
African participation in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) market has been slow 
to develop. Notwithstanding a significant increase in participation both in 2006 and in 2007, 
African CDM projects still represent only a small part of the total CDM pipeline. Moreover, 
even within Africa, the geographical distribution of CDM participation is highly uneven, 
with more than 60% of projects situated in South Africa (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2006:1). The 
distribution of African projects in the CDM pipeline, as well as their expected credit 
production, is given in Figure 4 below.  
 
Figure 4: African Projects in CDM Pipeline, by country 











Source:Own Calculations; Data from Fenhann, 2007. 
 
The Kuyasa low-cost urban housing energy upgrade project in Khayelitsha, South Africa, 
was the first Sub-Saharan African project to enter the CDM pipeline, at the end of 2004. By 
the end of August 2007, 32 projects from Sub-Saharan Africa were in the CDM project 
pipeline, out of a total of 2392 projects for all less developed countries. Nine African  
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countries had at least one project in the CDM pipeline: Equatorial Guinea
16, Ivory Coast, 
Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda (Fenhann, 2007). 
5.2 Advantages of the Clean Development Mechanism for Africa 
5.2.1  Sustainable development and success of projects 
The Delhi Declaration
17 recognizes that although “significant cuts in global emissions will 
be necessary to meet the Convention objective of stabilizing atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentrations... economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and 
overriding priorities” for developing countries (Venema and Cisse, 2004). 
By including the sustainable development requirement under the CDM, developing 
countries are effectively given the opportunity to address economic, social and 
environmental issues within a context of reducing greenhouse gas emissions (see Table 4 
below for sustainable development criteria identified by different host countries). 
Consequently a strong incentive for CDM participation is provided even for those African 
countries which would normally only be concerned with addressing immediate economic 
and social needs (Figueres, 2002 cited in Greene, 2005a:14). What is more, is that unlike 
much of the other Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) which flows into Africa – which is often 
linked to “extractive and other export orientated primary commodity industries” – “carbon 
finance is a highly productive form of FDI often targeted at small to medium size 
enterprises (SMEs), bringing technology transfer, local job creation and local environmental 
benefits” (Greene, 2005a:18). 
 
                                                 
16 Equatorial Guinea’s proposed project of Reduction of Flaring and Use of Recovered Gas for Methanol 
Production was rejected (Fenhann, 2007). 
17 A product of the 8
th Conference of the parties held in New Delhi, India, in November 2002 (Greene, 
2005a:13).  
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Table 4: Taxonomy of Sustainable Development Benefits with general criteria identified by 
host countries 
Social Criteria 




Provide financial returns to local entities 
Result in a positive impact on balance of payments 
Transfer new technology 
Increased provision of energy 
Environmental criteria 
Reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the use of fossil fuels 
Conserve local resources 
Reduce pressure on local environments 
Provide improved health and other environmental benefits 
Meet local renewable energy portfolio standards and other environmental policies 
Other Benefits 
Sustainability Tax 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Source: Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development, 2003; Olsen and Fenhann,2006:16  
 
Greene (2005:14) maintains that, especially in the case of Africa, the sustainable 
development benefits accruing from CDM projects should be viewed in the light of their 
contributions to meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
18. CDM projects, 
especially small-scale energy projects, could be seen to help meet the following goals 
(Greene, 2005a:14; United Nations, 2007): 
MDG 1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger – through the creation of jobs, electricity 
provision to rural areas, and the creation of sustainable livelihoods. 
MDG 4: Reduce Child Mortality – by improving the air quality in homes (through charcoal 
efficient stoves or roof top solar) and so reducing the cases of respiratory illness 
among children. 
MDG 7: Ensure environmental sustainability – through the reduction of air pollution and 
through reforestation and afforestation activities. 
MDG 8: Develop a global partnership for development – CDM activities promote 
collaboration between host countries and Annex I countries, as well as providing an 
additional incentive for the participation of non-Annex I countries in international 
climate negotiations. 
                                                 
18 The Millennium Development Goals are eight international development goals that 189 United Nations 
member states have agreed to aim to achieve by 2015. See http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/.  
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Most importantly however, through the revenue created by the sale of carbon credits, 
development projects that would normally not be viable due to lack of funding suddenly 
become sustainable (Lindow, 2005:55). The above is partly a reflection of the additionality 
clause under CDM. As carbon credits can only be obtained through projects that would 
normally not have taken place, CDM funding makes desperately needed, yet unprofitable, 
projects feasible (Pfifer, 2007). Moreover, in the context of the CDM, it is in the interests of 
Annex I investors that sustainable development projects in non-Annex I countries – which 
are the source of carbon credits – are successful. Annex I investors are able to drive project 
developments in non-Annex I countries based on “practical, hands-on experience” (Chicago 
Climate Exchange, 2007), making projects instigated under the CDM more likely to have 
long run success than projects instigated without it. 
5.2.2  Transfer of skills and technology 
With the entry into the carbon market, comes the transfer of knowledge and technology 
from Annex I producer countries to non-Annex I host countries. Under the technical 
description section of the project design document of the CDM, information must be 
provided as to how technology, if any, will be transferred to the non-Annex I host country 
(United Nations, 2006:23). The transfer of technology from producer countries – in the form 
of experience, know-how and equipment – is viewed as one of the main benefits of CDM, 
potentially leading to fulfilment of economic criteria under the different sustainable 
development dimensions (IPCC, 2000) (Olhoff et al., 2004:18).  
Through the attainment of the latest environmentally friendly technologies, host countries of 
CDM projects are given the opportunity to leapfrog the dirty stage of development without 
incurring the costs that would normally be associated with the acquisition of these 
technologies. What is more is that the infusion of advanced technologies is likely to increase 
the efficiency of African factories and electricity generating plants – leading to a lower cost 
structure and higher profits (Centric Austria International, 2007:18). With energy being one 
of the main drivers of economic development, the production of relatively cheap, clean 
energy is key to the international competitiveness of African countries (Greene, 2005a:13). 
Due to the close cooperation between host countries and Annex I recipients of carbon 
credits required by CDM projects, these projects also have a number of secondary benefits. 
Important role players of non-Annex 1 countries – such as universities, companies and even  
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individual entrepreneurs – are exposed to international business, global policy processes and 
financial negotiations, fostering skills development and international linkages, thus making 
them more internationally competitive (Greene, 2005a:14). 
5.2.3  Improved adaptive capacities 
Based on the theory of the sustainable livelihoods model of development, CDM projects are 
likely to lead either directly or indirectly to improved adaptive capacity of host countries 
due to the expansion of economic, social and natural capital they invoke (Greene, 
2005a:20). Certain types of CDM projects are, however, associated with specific direct 
benefits likely to accrue to African communities most vulnerable to climate change. A 
number of these benefits are given in Table 5 below. 
 
Finally, it must be remembered that the above mentioned benefits are purely a result of the 
CDM under the Kyoto protocol. Financial and technological resource commitments of 
Annex II parties, specified in Article 11.2 of the Protocol, are separate to the benefits 
discussed, and remain valid under the CDM. Moreover, CDM rules ensure that CDM 
projects do not lead to the displacement of other, regular development assistance 
(UNFCCC, 2007a).  
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Table 5: Direct benefits associated with different types of CDM projects 
Type of CDM project  Benefit  Reason for benefit 
Afforestation / 
Reforestation 
Protection from floods 
 












Reduced soil erosion 
Improved soil consistency can assist 
in preventing landslides 
Improved growing conditions for 
crops through increased shade & 
decreased water evaporation after 
rains. 
The use of endemic species for A/R 
projects can help conserve 
indigenous flora and fauna through 
the regeneration of habitats. 
Plantations under CDM are a 
potentially sustainable source of 
construction material, decreasing 
pressure on indigenous forests. 
Dams for micro hydro 
projects 
New source of water for 
irrigation and drinking – 
critical in many drought 
stricken African countries. 
Retention of water before being 
absorbed in the water table 
Installation of solar 
powered water heaters 
Decreased dependence on 








Helps prevent the spread of 




Reduce dependence on 
biomass from local forests 
 
Roof insulation projects  Assist poor communities to 
adapt to extreme 
temperatures 
 
Source: Greene, 2005a:20; Capoor and Ambrosi, 2006:2,3 
 
5.2.4  Access to new markets 
If, as argued under section 3.3,  carbon credits really are just another type of financial 
instrument, the CDM provides an opportunity for African countries to enter this global 
market while it is still in its nascent stages. It allows African parties to “acquire cutting edge 
measurement and trading skills that will be needed in a global context in the short and long 
term” (Chicago Climate Exchange, 2007).  
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However, it is not only to a budding market to which Africa receives access, but rather to a 
global trend of cleaner development, cleaner technology and a philosophy of countering 
global warming. Although legally binding emission targets are currently only relevant to 
developed countries, it is likely that middle income countries will also be subject to 
emission targets in the future (Greene, 2005a:15). Through instituting cleaner technologies, 
raising awareness about environmental issues and cooperating with major global role-
players, African countries can be part of, and play a role in, global developments; an aspect 
likely to positively contribute to Africa’s role in future international developments. 
5.3 Examining the potential of the CDM in Africa 
Ten years after the signing of the Kyoto protocol, hopes of extensive investment in African 
CDM projects have remained largely unfulfilled. To a certain extent it is obvious that the 
continent with the lowest greenhouse gas emissions will have the fewest opportunities for 
abatement projects. Due to the relatively slow pace of both its current as well as its expected 
future development, it is clear that Africa will have a more limited amount of CDM 
investment opportunities than, say, Asia (Bess, 2005:1). Nevertheless, Africa’s relatively 
low rate of emissions is not sufficient to explain the current state of affairs. 
The last 20 years have shown record growth of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) levels to 
Africa. Increased investor confidence can largely be attributed to the improved 
infrastructure, macroeconomic and political management, as well as foreign ownership laws 
– all of which have created a more favourable investment climate in many African countries 
over the last few years. Most of this investment has gone to mining, fuel and other energy 
sectors (UNCTAD, 2005:4,12), all of which have large potential for carbon mitigation 
projects due the large amount of greenhouse gas emissions which result from activities in 
these sectors (Greene, 2005a:16).  
Accompanying the improved investment climate in many African countries is a large 
potential to realize the development prerequisite of the CDM. The high demand for jobs and 
foreign currency, and the acute need for industrial development and sustainable livelihoods 
in most African countries, makes the creation of a sustainable development dividend 
through CDM projects easier in Africa than in many other regions (Greene, 2005a:18).   
Moreover, the demand for energy throughout the continent, but especially in poorer 
countries, is enormous. Over three-quarters of Sub-Saharan Africans do not have access to  
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electricity, compared to only approximately 14% of Latin Americans and East Asians. With 
the contribution of exploitation of fossil fuels to the development and security of African 
people being questionable, and with resources for energy such as biomass, geothermal and 
hydropower being abundant, this provides a sizeable potential market for sustainable and 
renewable energy (Simms and Reid, 2005:4,20). 
In sum, an improved investment climate, abundant carbon mitigation opportunities, as well 
as the potential to create large development dividends in African countries, suggests that 
numerous CDM opportunities in Africa still remain unexploited (UNCTAD, 2006:1). 
5.4  Factors preventing the exploitation of CDM opportunities in Africa 
A number of rules have been implemented under the Kyoto protocol in an attempt to make 
CDM projects in host countries which provide less lucrative CDM investment opportunities, 
more attractive. The above include the exemption of least developed countries’ (LDCs) 
CDM projects from the adaptation levy, as well as the creation of special rules for small 
scale CDM projects (Jung, 2005:17). However, a number of barriers which impede the 
success of CDM project development in African countries remain. According to Ellis and 
Kamel (2007:17,34), these barriers can broadly be divided into four categories. National 
barriers are country specific rather than being related specifically to the CDM. Examples 
include a countries policy or legislative framework – barriers which are particular to the 
context in which CDM projects operate. CDM-related barriers are specific to the CDM and 
include factors such as institutional capacity as well as country awareness about the CDM 
and its potential. Project-related barriers are specific to individual projects, and include 
barriers such as availability of finance and project specific risks. Finally, international 
barriers include barriers such as investor criteria on project type, location or size; exclusion 
of certain types of CDM projects in the pre-2012 period; and uncertainty about post-2012 
rulings – all of which influence geographic location of CDM activity. 
5.4.1  National barriers: policy and legislative framework 
A country’s policy and legislative framework, which plays a large part in determining the 
general investment climate, has a large bearing on a country’s CDM activity. Among other 
things, factors contributing to a favourable CDM investment climate include a legislative 
system which is stable and enforced, a stable political regime and macro-economic climate, 
a tax-incentive framework encouraging investment, limited barriers to foreign ownership, a  
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skilled pool of workers, as well as a clear policy regarding CDM-related issues (Ellis and 
Kamel, 2007:18). Unfortunately, few African countries satisfy the above criteria (World 
Bank, 2007).  
5.4.2  CDM-related barriers: lack of infrastructure and awareness 
Research conducted by numerous institutions (such as the UNIDO, UNEP, the World Bank 
and the EU, among others) has shown that many African countries are still in need of 
extensive capacity building before they will be able to become effective players in the 
competitive carbon market (Greene, 2005b:11). As is evident from section 4.2, the CDM 
process may appear bureaucratic and convoluted, especially from the view of African 
governments. With a lack of local infrastructure and qualified personnel in most African 
countries, the fulfilment of numerous requirements of the CDM process – the establishment 
of a DNA, conducting project baseline studies, fulfilling approved methodologies, 
registering projects with the CDM executive, etc. – becomes difficult (Goldsmith and 
Mckeown in Greene, 2005a:35).  
The lack of CDM infrastructure is accompanied by, and can often be attributed to, a general 
lack of awareness of the CDM among numerous African governments. Furthermore, many 
African constituencies are not yet convinced of the development and financial benefits 
associated with hosting CDM projects, making them resistant to the diversion of scarce 
resources from more immediate development concerns such as healthcare and education 
(Greene, 2005b:11; Nanasta, 2007:5). This lack of awareness is in turn directly linked to a 
scarcity of data and statistics which normally assist local entrepreneurs in developing PDDs 
for CDM projects, as well as serving as a means for governments to discover sectors with 
potential for CDM development (Upadhyaya, 2007:14). 
5.4.3  Project related barriers 
a.  Access to finance 
Not only is the CDM project cycle relatively complex, but it also a reasonably lengthy and 
expensive procedure.  Mariyappan, et al. (in Greene, 2005a:29) have found development 
costs for small-scale CDM projects to be no less than US$ 30 000, while large-scale projects 
come no cheaper than approximately US$ 80 000.  
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Most private carbon funds will not issue carbon finance until shortly before the CERs are 
delivered. Usually only public carbon funds are willing to accept the risk of non-delivery by 
providing up front funding for CDM projects. As such, project developers from non-Annex 
I countries have the choice of making use of public funds or, alternatively, finding access to 
capital to cover project expenses until CERs are issued. Issued CERs from this ‘Unilateral 
CDM’ financing structure can then normally be sold at a premium (Cosbey et al., 2005:51 
;Greene, 2005a:9). 
The prevalence of unilateral CDM thus depends largely on the accessibility of project 
finance for CDM projects. In most African countries, access to project finance is generally a 
problem. Due to most African financial intermediaries’ lack of knowledge about the 
profitability and risks associated with CDM projects, and due to the general persistence of 
high interest rates in African countries, attracting finance for CDM projects is exceptionally 
difficult for African developers – deferring entry into initial stages of project preparations 
(Greene, 2005a:9; UNEP Risø, 2007).  
b.  CDM specific project risks 
A number of standard risks, attributable to the CDM process, accompany investment in 
CDM projects. These include the risk of delayed approval by the DNA; the risk associated 
with problems or delays with project validation and registration; the risk of erroneous 
calculation of emission reductions or sequestration during the monitoring stage; as well as 
risks associated with the demand for, and so price of, CERs on large trading schemes (Ellis 
and Kamel, 2007:31). As such, for investors, there is always a risk associated with the 
delivery of CERs, the timing of delivery, and  the quality of CERs eventually delivered 
(Kapoor and Ambrosi, 2007:32). Although the above risks are standard to investment in 
CDM projects, they are likely to be aggravated by factors such as unstable governmental 
regimes or a labour force characterized by a large proportion of unskilled labour – both of 
which are typical of many African countries. 
5.4.4  International barriers 
a.  Sustainability as a non-market good 
In a competitive market, smaller, community-based projects which promote efficient or 
renewable energy have little scope due to their high costs relative to large projects which  
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destroy industrial gas to generate large amounts of relatively cheap credits.  Thus, although 
community-based projects with large sustainable development dividends is what most 
hoped the CDM would deliver, carbon credit buyers are naturally inclined to rather make 
use of cheaper, but much less environmentally and socially attractive projects (Lohmann, 
2006:272) 
As discussed in section 4.1, achieving sustainable development in non-Annex I host 
countries is one of the primary objectives of the CDM. Notwithstanding, to what extent 
CDM projects have actually led to sustainable development has been subject to much 
debate. The reason for the scepticism is that the CDM rulebook delegates the responsibility 
for achieving sustainable development to the respective host country’s DNAs: allowing non-
Annex I host countries to determine their own national sustainable development criteria, 
rather than delegating standards for sustainable development criteria from an international 
level. Non-carbon elements of CDM projects, such as sustainable development benefits, do 
however not possess a monetary value in the carbon market – serving as a disincentive for 
host countries to establish rigorous sustainable development criteria in an internationally 
competitive market. The above may in turn lead to projects with minimal positive, and 
sometimes even negative, social and environmental impacts (Worthington, 2005:52; Olsen 
and Fenhann, 2006:1-2). 
b.  Project types 
i.  ‘Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry’ (LULUCF) 
Until 2012, afforestation and reforestation (A/R) projects
19 are the only eligible LULUCF 
projects eligible under the CDM (Ellis and Kamel, 2007:36). This results in the systematic 
exclusion of large classes of LULUCF assets – such as soil sequestration, fire management 
and avoided deforestation – which provide potentially attractive opportunities for natural 
resource rich African economies. 
African countries have been forerunners in finding pioneering methods to sequester carbon 
through A/R activities which simultaneously deliver large social, environmental and 
economic benefits (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2006:2). Due to the large extent of land 
degradation in many African countries, as well as the heavy reliance on wood resources for 
energy, the African continent offers considerable potential for large-scale A/R activities.  
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Moreover, low technology requirements associated with growing trees make A/R projects 
accessible even to rural communities (Desanker, 2005:25). A/R projects have further been 
identified as those projects which most assist African countries in the adaptation to climate 
change (Greene, 2005a:21,29). 
The inclusion of ‘sink’ projects under the CDM has, however, been one of the most 
contentious issues under the mechanism due to the large degree of scientific uncertainty 
about the amount of carbon which is removed through these types of projects, as well as due 
to concerns about the permanence of such sequestrations – i.e. fears that carbon absorbed 
through forests could potentially be re-emitted in the future (Worthington, 2005:52). 
Accordingly, the Marrakech Accords placed a cap of 1% on the number of A/R CDM 
project credits which could be used to meet Annex I compliance levels. Further, credits 
from A/R project activities have been assigned a temporary nature, with their validity 
expiring after a number of years (Ellis and Kamel, 2006:36). Due to the same reasons, the 
EU Emission Trading Scheme outlaws the sale of CERs resulting from LULUCF activities. 
The temporary nature of the credits, as well as exclusion from the world’s largest carbon 
trading scheme, has resulted in the price of LULUCF CERs remaining lower than those 
from other CDM activities. 
The rules surrounding A/R activities have further potential to inflict harm on African 
societies and ecosystems, in that they currently offer no protection for existing forests and 
grasslands, while single species plantations are included under the present definition of 
forestry. This leads to the potential threat of the destruction of diverse indigenous 
ecosystems, in an effort to obtain credits through fast-growing, monoculture plantations. 
Mono-plantations come with their own disadvantages, having ecologically detrimental 
qualities such as “biodiversity loss, water table disruption and pollution from herbicides and 
pesticides” (Bachram, 2004:8), while at the same time leading to the possible displacement 
of local communities in order to appropriate land for plantations (Bachram, 2004:8;   
Lohmann, 2006:241). 
Luckily, the above problems have largely been recognized by the international community. 
A new facility, the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), is being developed by the 
World Bank in an effort to assist developing countries to conserve their forests. This facility 
aims at providing future large-scale incentives, also in the form of carbon credits, for 
                                                                                                                                                      
19 A/R projects are often referred to as ‘sink projects’ (Desanker, 2005:25).  
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decreasing the rate of deforestation (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2007:30; Nicholls, 2007:3). 
Further positive future developments include the possibility that LULUCF project activities 
will be allowed under the EU ETS for the second commitment period (2008-2012) 
(European Union, 2007:6). 
ii.  Renewable energy 
The additionality rule of the CDM has been subject to much criticism. The judgement as to 
which emission reductions are additional to reductions which would have occurred in the 
absence of the project activity, is viewed as a subjective one – one which is unlikely to be 
correctly made by a remote panel with limited knowledge of business decision making 
(Greene, 2005a:29).  As development status and electricity access are so different in Africa 
compared to most other countries, satisfying the additionality criterion is often more 
difficult, especially for projects in the electricity sector. Due to the use of small scale clean 
energy technologies (mainly hydro-energy) in many of the least developed African 
countries, any project introducing clean, grid-connected electricity, will struggle to receive 
carbon credits, as it has to, under the additionality rules of the CDM, demonstrate that it 
supplants ‘carbon-intensive’ electricity (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2007:25).  
c.  Uncertainty about post 2012 developments 
One of the reasons why the CDM may not yet have reached its full potential is due to the 
uncertainty surrounding the future of the carbon market. International consensus about the 
most appropriate way to address global warming has yet to be reached, and as such no 
emission targets have yet been set under Kyoto for the commitment period post 2012. This 
raises the question of whether CERs or other types of project based trading mechanisms will 
be valid in the future, making project credits issued beyond 2012 largely worthless. This is 
particularly relevant for Africa, where many countries are only starting to enter the carbon 
market. Furthermore, much of Africa’s CDM potential lies in forestry and renewable energy 
projects – the project types which generally require the longest credit periods in order to 
make projects viable (Greene, 2005a:29). 
Despite the above mentioned uncertainty, however, the Kyoto protocol remains the only 
game in town, with 90% of respondents of a recent International Emissions Trading 
Association (IETA) Market Sentiment survey indicating that they believe that the 
greenhouse gas market will continue post 2012 (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2007:38).    
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Furthermore, in an effort to scale-up carbon finance ‘post-Kyoto,’ the World Bank has just 
approved a carbon fund valuing around $500-million, which is to specialize in purchasing 
credits beyond 2012 (Nicholls, 2007:3). 
5.5  Policy suggestions 
5.5.1  Policy suggestions for CDM oversight bodies  
In an effort to increase the efficiency of – and increase the demand for – African CDM 
projects, a number of changes in CDM modalities and procedures should be considered by 
CDM oversight bodies. Decreasing project registration fees, as well as increasing the 
maximum size of projects qualifying for the simplified modalities and procedures of small-
scale projects could, for example, be used to fast-track CDM project start-up. Further, 
numerous actions relating to LULUCF activities could be taken to increase Africa’s share of 
CDM projects.  These include increasing or abandoning the cap on the amount of CERs 
from LULUCF activities that may be used to meet Annex I emission targets; including 
projects which prevent deforestation as permissible greenhouse gas reduction activities; and 
fast-tracking the acceptance of other LULUCF project types as permissible greenhouse gas 
reduction methodologies (Greene, 2005a:38). 
Finally, it is critical that efforts be taken to prevent the continued weakening of sustainable 
development standards of CDM projects propelled by the need to attract investment. 
Although internationally determined sustainability prerequisites would in many cases be 
desirable, this solution is politically very unlikely. An alternative solution would be the 
creation of sustainability ‘principles and guidelines’ at an international level, which could 
then be tailored at the domestic level to fit country specific circumstances and needs 
(Cosbey et al., 2005:44). 
5.5.2  Policy suggestions for the UNFCCC 
The UNFCCC is both the principal, and the most powerful decision making body on climate 
change. As such, the UNFCCC should adopt the role of encouraging and supporting the 
private sector and provide it with the necessary confidence to make continuing, long term 
investments in the CDM project market. This can be achieved by explicitly demonstrating 
support of the elements of the current system as cardinal constituents of a potential post 
Kyoto Climate Treaty, as well as possibly guaranteeing the validity of CERs for a post 2012  
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period (Cosbey et al., 2005:52). Further, by increasing affirmation of the primacy of the 
sustainable development component of both current and future project based mechanisms, 
the UNFCCC would encourage long term investment in more environmentally and socially 
beneficial CDM projects – indirectly encouraging increased CDM investment in Africa 
(Greene, 2005a:38).   
5.5.3  Policy suggestions for CDM host countries 
Although the international organizations and decision making bodies can make a large 
contribution to the success of the CDM in Africa, the final and most critical determining 
factors will be the actions of African host countries to provide lucrative and attractive 
opportunities for CDM project development. Continued, active and explicit support for good 
governance, a stable and reliable legislative system, infrastructure development, institutional 
and industrial development, as well as the systematic elimination of other barriers related to 
CDM investments are critical for the success of the CDM in Africa.  
There are, however, also actions relating more specifically to active promotion of the CDM 
which should be taken by African host countries. These include the development of a lucid 
policy on CDM-related issues; the collection and provision of data and statistics to facilitate 
the establishment of CDM projects; the creation of small DNA oversight bodies in areas 
where sectoral potential for CDM projects are identified; and limiting the role of existing 
DNAs to approving sustainability criteria and endorsing the commencement of project 
activities (Greene, 2005a:38; Bakker et al., 2007:18; Ellis and Kamel, 2007:18). Further, 
countries should identify flagship CDM projects, both in an endeavour to heighten investor 
confidence and to provide blueprints for future CDM projects (Bakker et al., 2007:18). In an 
effort to reduce operational costs and develop existing CDM capacity, African countries 
should also consider bundling projects across sectors, and possibly even between countries 
(Desanker, 2005:26). 
Finally, it is critical that African experts begin to participate actively in international climate 
change negotiations, and in particular in CDM design - both at the COP level, as well as in 
grassroots project management. Additionally, the above involvement should be bolstered by 
research and analysis conducted by African scientists who are able to make allowance for 
local conditions (Desanker, 2005:26). 
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5.5.4  Policy suggestions for international institutions and agencies 
Although much work is already being done in an effort to build CDM capacity and so 
increase the supply of CDM projects in Africa
20, it is essential that assistance to the 
continent is both broadened and deepened (Greene, 2005a:35). Further, increased provision 
of official development assistance (ODA), could aid in developing the capacity of CDM 
related institutions (especially DNAs), could assist in the start up of valuable African CDM 
projects, as well as assist projects in achieving their sustainable development goals (Capoor 
and Ambrosi, 2006:23). 
5.5.5  An integrated approach 
All of the above policy recommendations are seen as viable and effective ways to encourage 
the growth of the CDM in Africa. However, isolated actions by any one of the above 
mentioned parties is unlikely to lead to the desired growth and development of the CDM in 
Africa. As such, an ideal situation would be an integrated approach in which global actors 
cooperate and the above policy recommendations are amalgamated in an effort help the 
CDM reach its true potential in Africa. 
However, although the expansion of the CDM in Africa holds promising opportunities for 
many African countries, it is nevertheless necessary to remain realistic about the probability 
of certain African countries attracting carbon finance for CDM projects. Africa is made up 
of many diverse countries – some with more potential to attract, and make use of carbon 
finance, than others (Greene, 2005a:37). 
Further, although the CDM has the potential to bring many additional investment resources, 
and other benefits to host countries, it must be remembered that the CDM is not a way to 
solve all African development issues. It is merely another opportunity which can be levered 
in an effort to promote the sustainable development of African countries, while at the same 
time involving Africa in creating a cleaner future (Stowell, 2005:65).  
 
                                                 
20 The largest recent capacity building initiative was the launch of the Nairobi Framework of Action at the 
COP12 in 2006. This framework is a joint initiative of the UNEP, the UNDP, the UNFCCC, the African 
Development Bank and the World Bank, among others, and aims to improve the participation of Sub-Saharan 
Africa in the CDM (Bakker et al, 2007:15). For more information on the Nairobi Framework of Action, see 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Nairobi_Framework/index.html.   
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6.  CONCLUSION 
The issue of climate change has in the past decade taken a front seat on the international 
agenda. Global warming is no longer a worry restricted to the scientific community, but has 
become a reality affecting the entire international community. While the repercussions of 
climate change will be felt everywhere, impacts will be worst in poorer, developing 
countries which have less ability to adapt to adverse effects of global warming. Owing to 
the heavy reliance on agriculture and the extreme vulnerability of African populations to 
climate related shocks, African countries are expected to be amongst the worst affected by 
climate change. 
Due to the nature of climate change as a global externality problem, tackling the issue is 
problematic and requires global cooperation. The Kyoto protocol of 1997 is the product of 
this cooperation and specifies emission targets for developed countries which can be met 
both via local emission reductions and through the use of flexible trading mechanisms. The 
size of the carbon market, created as a result of these free market mechanisms, has 
mushroomed since the official inception of the protocol in February 2005.  
The most developed of the “flexibility mechanisms” is the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), which allows developed countries to meet part of their obligations under the 
protocol by investing in emission reducing, sustainability promoting, projects in developing 
countries; providing an effective means for developing countries to both participate, and 
benefit from, the budding carbon market. Due to the sustainable development dividend 
accompanying CDM projects, the CDM has the potential to bring enormous social, 
economic and environmental benefits to Africa – effectively embodying a means of clean, 
sustainable development for African countries.   Although Africa represents a vast untapped 
market for CDM project opportunities, a number of national, CDM-related, project-related, 
and international barriers still prevent the full exploitation of CDM opportunities in Africa. 
As such, it is critical for major international role players to cooperate and promote the 
development of the CDM in Africa by streamlining the rules pertaining to CDM related 
projects, strengthening the international carbon trading system, and taking actions to 
emphasize the importance of the sustainability component of CDM projects. 
If the above is successful, and the demand for emission reductions from Africa burgeons, 
millions, and possibly even billions of dollars of carbon finance would flow into Africa. Not 
only would this aid in attaining a clean energy future, but it would play an invaluable role in  
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the social and environmental development of the continent, and possibly be the cornerstone 
in the realization of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. This, unquestionably, is a 
goal worth striving for.  
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